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THE 1,500-HOUR RULE: WHEN DOES QUANTITY
OUTWEIGH QUALITY?
ANDREA TRAUT*
AIRLINES IN THE United States are currently experiencingwhat could be described as a modern golden age. In 2015,
airlines had a record-breaking year—earning $24.8 billion in af-
ter-tax profit.1 In 2016, airlines earned $14 billion, and in 2017,
they experienced their second-most profitable year ever, with af-
ter-tax profits of $15.5 billion.2 It is important to note, however,
that the two biggest drivers of airline costs and profits are labor
and fuel.3 Fuel contributes to about 10%-12% of operating costs
for airlines.4 The drop in oil prices from 2014 to 2017 is prima-
rily responsible for the record profits of recent years because
labor costs are mostly fixed.5
Unfortunately for airlines, it appears that this era of record
profits may start to decline as fuel costs are expected to climb.6
With labor costs accounting for nearly 35% of airlines’ total op-
erating expenses, airlines must find ways to reduce these fixed
costs during economic downturns.7 However, labor costs are
also beginning to rise at a steady rate, as airlines race to fill the
pilot staffing necessary to meet the demand of increasing world
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2020; B.S. (2013) and M.S.
(2015) in Aviation Management from Purdue University.
1 Bart Jansen, Airlines Had Second-Most Profitable Year Ever in 2017, USA TODAY
(May 7, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/todayinthesky/20
18/05/07/airline-profits/586619002/ [https://perma.cc/97EB-EG7D].
2 Id.
3 Brian Beers, Which Major Expenses Affect Airline Companies?, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://investopedia.com/ask/answers/040715/what-are-major-expenses-affect-




6 Daniel Shane, Higher Oil Prices are Taking a Toll on Airline Profits, CNN BUS.
(June 4, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/04/investing/iata-airline-prof
its-oil/index.html [https://perma.cc/9FNN-G3A3].
7 See Beers, supra note 3.
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air traffic.8 This hiring race is largely the product of what is con-
sidered a worldwide pilot shortage caused by Congress’s adop-
tion of the 1,500-hour rule following the crash of Colgan Air
Flight 3407.9 This requirement has begun to force airlines to
offer hiring incentives to steal qualified pilots away from other
airlines, which puts small airlines at an enormous competitive
disadvantage, places a large potential price burden on consum-
ers, and threatens underserved regional routes and private
aviation.10
Despite the promulgated safety benefits of the rule, the practi-
cal threats it poses to airlines’ operations are too serious for
Congress to ignore. Congress should reduce the flight-hour re-
quirement and focus instead on a standardized flight training
education rule because of the 1,500-hour rule’s economic conse-
quences and the lack of evidence that the rule actually improves
flight safety. Part I of this Comment discusses the background of
the airline industry in the United States and the Colgan Air acci-
dent. Part II illustrates the legislative response to the Colgan Air
accident. Finally, Part III of this Comment analyzes the successes
and failures of current legislation and suggests a new focus on
quality enforcement for air safety improvement.
I. INDUSTRY BACKGROUND AND THE COLGAN
AIR ACCIDENT
A. HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Aviation in the United States has long been envisioned as a
tool for economic development and expedition.11 Air travel was
first commercialized by the Post Office Department in the 1920s
for the carriage of mail.12 United Airlines, American Airlines,
Trans World Airlines, and Eastern Airlines all owe their founda-
8 Jon Sindreu, Pilot Shortage Hurts Airlines, but There’s a Winner, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
17, 2018), http://www.wsj.com/articles/pilot-shortage-hurts-airlines-but-theres-a-
winner-1539780789 [https://perma.cc/NB46-NAFX].
9 Marisa Garcia, A ‘Perfect Storm’ Pilot Shortage Threatens Global Aviation, FORBES




11 Paul Stephen Dempsey, The State of the Airline, Airport & Aviation Industries,
21 TRANSP. L.J. 129, 133 (1992).
12 Id. at 134.
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tion—at least in part—to the government subsidies offered to
private carriers for mail service.13
Unfortunately, high levels of danger marred this initial era of
commercial travel, as thirty-one of the first forty mail service pi-
lots died in crashes.14 Because of the high risk of danger, in the
1930s, President Franklin Roosevelt signed the Civil Aeronautics
Act, which led to the establishment of the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB).15 The CAB was designed “to investigate accidents,
determine probable cause, issue reports, and recommend addi-
tional safety measures.”16 Continuing the idea of government
subsidization, the CAB also had the power to regulate where air-
lines could fly, what airlines could charge, and certain business
practices in light of antitrust regulation.17 By regulating the in-
dustry like a public utility and continuing to offer subsidies, the
government was able to prop up the increasingly important in-
dustry through economic downturns.18 As air service expanded,
the CAB grandfathered in sixteen original contracted airlines to
serve highly-profitable long-haul trunk routes while certificating
other, smaller airlines—now known as regional airlines—to ser-
vice small airports.19
Airlines enjoyed rapid technological improvements, including
the introduction of the jet engine, through the 1950s and
1960s.20 The introduction of the jet engine led to a new, more
productive and more profitable era of commercial aviation.21
The jet engine extended the time an engine could operate
before needing heavy maintenance and increased the comfort
of the aircraft for passengers by reducing vibrations.22 It also al-
lowed aircrafts to fly at higher altitudes, thus permitting pilots to
navigate around weather while promoting more efficient engine
use.23 With continued government regulation in airline route
distribution and pricing, these improvements allowed airlines to
13 See id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 135.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 139.
18 Id. at 138, 140.
19 Id. at 139–40.
20 Id. at 141.
21 Id.
22 See Swayne Martin, 7 Benefits of Jets Over Piston Powered Airplanes, BOLD
METHOD (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.boldmethod.com/blog/lists/2017/10/7-
benefits-of-jet-engines/ [https://perma.cc/8HQQ-B22J].
23 Id.
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flourish in a “golden age of aviation,” with a focus on quality of
service as more and more passengers sought seats.24
However, safety continued to be of great concern. An inde-
pendent federal aviation agency was created in 1958 to oversee
the safety of the national airspace through the use of air traffic
control towers.25 In 1966, Congress authorized the creation of
the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the agency,
known as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), became a
subsidiary of it.26 As more and more aircraft entered the skies,
the FAA modernized the national airspace to include radar,
computers, radio, and air traffic controllers as well as facilities
across the country to monitor system-wide air traffic and
weather.27 With this new technology coupled with the introduc-
tion of the jet engine, the aviation industry welcomed a steady
decrease in fatality rates in the United States until the terrorist
attacks in 2001.28 In fact, excluding those attacks, from 1998 to
2008, the fatality risk in the United States decreased by 83%.29
B. THE END OF FEDERAL REGULATION
With profit margins for the larger carriers soaring, in 1978,
President Jimmy Carter signed the Airline Deregulation Act
(ADA).30 The major part of the ADA served to dissolve the CAB
and to end the treatment of airlines like a public utility.31 The
government no longer set where airlines could fly or what fares
they could charge, and airlines could no longer benefit from a
24 Madhu Unnikrishnan, A Law that Changed the Airline Industry Beyond Recogni-
tion (1978), AVIATION WK. (June 4, 2015), http://aviationweek.com/blog/law-
changed-airline-industry-beyond-recognition-1978 [https://perma.cc/W3AL-T6
KL].
25 A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/about/
history/brief_history/#atc [https://perma.cc/3L37-3CE5] (last visited May 28,
2019).
26 Dempsey, supra note 11, at 141.
27 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 25.
28 See Dan Reed, In a Dangerous World, U.S. Commercial Aviation Is on a Remarka-
ble Safety Streak, FORBES (Dec. 28, 2016), https://forbes.com/sites/danielreed/
2016/12/28/in-the-last-7-years-you-were-more-likely-to-be-run-over-by-a-car-than-
to-die-in-an-airline-crash/#44d6d8d2428a [https://perma.cc/FKS7-C7TU].
29 Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Final Rule Requires Safety Man-
agement Systems for Airlines (Jan. 7, 2015) (on file with author), https://www.
faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=18094 [https://perma.cc/
HEM3-VLJG].
30 Unnikrishnan, supra note 24.
31 Id.
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guaranteed revenue stream.32 For many of the trunk airlines,
this meant that they now had massive operating costs while new,
low-cost carriers (LCCs) were able to enter previously protected
routes and compete on a pure price basis.33 Consequently, a
number of these trunk carriers exited the market via merger.34
The remaining airlines faced a rapid decrease in airfares and a
dramatic increase in passenger demand.35
Though passenger demand increased after the ADA, airlines
were now ruled by cost, which created huge concerns for areas
that came to rely on air service to maintain and grow their local
economies.36 Smaller regional airports were at risk of airlines
removing service completely because there was not enough de-
mand to guarantee profit without government contracts.37 Due
to this threat, the DOT founded the Essential Air Service pro-
gram (EAS).38 Through the EAS, the DOT subsidizes airlines in
two- or four-year contracts for two round trips a day to qualified
small communities.39 To qualify, the communities must be more
than 210 miles from the closest large- or medium-sized airport.40
As of October 2016, the DOT subsidized about 113 destinations
across the continental United States.41
In addition to the threat toward small communities, the ADA
had another unintended consequence. Several trunk carriers
were grandfathered into high-revenue, long-haul international
and transcontinental routes.42 With guaranteed profit in high-
volume markets, these carriers never had a need to develop an
internal network of routes to smaller markets.43 For trunk carri-
ers incapable of changing their business models quickly enough
32 Id.
33 See William Charles De Jager, The Effects of Airline Deregulation on Airline
Safety: An Econometric Analysis 14 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Port-
land State University) (on file with PDXScholar), https://pdxscholar.libra
ry.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2296&amp=&context=open_access_etds
&amp [https://perma.cc/8TLS-CEGU].
34 Id. at 13.
35 Id.








42 See Dempsey, supra note 11, at 140–42.
43 See Unnikrishnan, supra note 24.
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to be competitive, the only solution was consolidation.44 In
2015, four airlines—American, Delta, Southwest, and United
Airlines—controlled 85% of flights in the United States.45 With
this level of control, the four major airlines are able to largely
dictate who is flying in and out of individual cities and regions as
well as the price charged for each individual route.46 While
prices have generally fallen after the ADA, it has led to similar
issues that caused the establishment of the EAS.47 When these
airlines come to the conclusion that cities are not meeting ex-
pected profits, they are quick to “drastically curtail[ ] airline ser-
vice.”48 This led to a lack of air service to several mid-major cities
that do not qualify for the EAS, such as Cincinnati, St. Louis,
Pittsburgh, and Memphis.49 Over the last four years, thirty-two
communities have lost air service.50 Some cities have attempted
to maintain air service by paying the airlines directly to ensure a
minimum revenue for the airlines.51
Given this minimum revenue, one of the ways major airlines,
like American Airlines, continue to serve these smaller markets
is by employing regional carriers.52 Regional carriers are essen-
tially subcontractors for the major carriers that operate under a
marketing arrangement known as a codeshare.53 These
codeshare flights make up about half of all domestic flights in
the United States.54 Under a codeshare agreement, an airline
can place its name on a flight and sell that flight while another
44 See Alex Marshall, How Airline Mergers and Deregulation Hurt Travel, GOV-





47 See David Morris, Airline Deregulation: A Triumph of Ideology Over Evidence, HUF-
FINGTON POST, https://www.huffing tonpost.com/david-morris/airline-deregula
tion-ideology-over-evidence_b_4399150.html [https://perma.cc/R78L-HL5L]
(last updated Dec. 13, 2013).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Aditi Shrikant, Why Air Service Is So Crucial for Small Cities, VOX, https://
www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/11/12/18080806/air-service-small-cities-crucial
[https://perma.cc/MU2G-8P7K] (last updated Nov. 12, 2018).
51 Id.
52 See id.
53 Code Sharing, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.transporta-
tion.gov/policy/aviation-policy/licensing/code-sharing [https://perma.cc/
A8PX-ZT7E].
54 Justin Bachman, U.S. Regional Airlines Out-Do Bigger Rivals in On-Time Flights,
CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nation
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airline actually operates the flight.55 These agreements contract
the routes the regional carriers will fly for the major carriers, the
fixed cost the regional carrier will make for the completed
flights, and any performance-based incentives that may be in-
cluded in the agreement.56 With guaranteed revenue for the re-
gional carrier, the risk of the flight really lies with the major
carrier, since profit for major carriers requires them to make
enough revenue through ticket sales to overcome the money
they are contracted to pay their regional partner.57 Unfortu-
nately, people from these smaller communities pay higher fares
or else face longer commutes to fly out of cheaper, major city
airports.58 These smaller communities are often forced to subsi-
dize service through agreements to guarantee revenue, waive
certain airport fees, and market the flights themselves to main-
tain the major carriers’ continued interest in maintaining ser-
vice to their community.59 Some more affluent communities are
willing and able to take on this burden because commercial air
service is vital to the global nature of modern-day business.60
For regional carriers with fixed revenue, profit can be guaran-
teed by keeping operating costs down and by ensuring that as
many flights as possible are completed per the contract.61 The
biggest way in which the regional carriers do this is by hiring
pilots with little to no commercial experience at a low wage.62 His-
torically, as part of their employment contract, these pilots are
then guaranteed an interview or position with the major carrier
partner after the pilot has gained the experience necessary to fly
the larger aircraft of the major carrier.63 With the cost of pilot
training often exceeding six figures, working for regional air-
lines is an ideal path for many prospective professional pilots
world/ct-regional-airlines-outdo-rivals-20180925-story.html [https://perma.cc/
AJM7-J7M9].
55 Code Sharing, supra note 53.
56 Ben Schlappig, Why Do Major Airlines Outsource Flights to Regional Airlines?,
ONE MILE AT A TIME (July 19, 2016), https://onemileatatime.com/regional-air-
lines/ [https://perma.cc/GCR8-AK4N].
57 See id.
58 Shrikant, supra note 50.
59 Id.
60 See id.
61 See Schlappig, supra note 56.
62 See id.
63 Marc Cervantes, The Regional Airline Concept, AERO CREW NEWS (Oct. 3,
2017), https://www.aerocrewnews.com/education-2/contract-talks/the-regional-
airline-concept/ [https://perma.cc/ZJN2-TZLW].
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because they can receive the experience on commercial jet air-
craft they need while still receiving a paycheck.64
C. COLGAN AIR FLIGHT 3408
One such regional carrier was Colgan Air. The airline was
founded in 1989 by Charles and Michael Colgan.65 In 1997, Col-
gan Air signed a codeshare agreement with Continental Airlines
to operate regional flights in the mid-Atlantic and northeastern
United States.66 Under the codeshare agreement, Colgan Air
operated Continental Airlines-branded flights with Continental
Airlines-branded flightcrew, but all equipment was owned and
maintained by Colgan Air, and all crewmembers were employed
by Colgan Air.67
Over the course of the next twelve years, there were numer-
ous events that raised concerns regarding the operational safety
of the airline.68 Problems first arose in 1998 when Colgan Air
acknowledged to the FAA that significant improvements were
needed to comply with the safety requirements set forth by the
agency for commercial carriers.69 However, five years later, a
Colgan Air flight crashed off of Cape Cod, killing both pilots.70
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that
the accident was caused by “improper plane maintenance” and
“inadequate pilot inspection.”71
In June 2005, Colgan Air’s FAA inspector suggested FAA in-
tervention after finding a number of safety concerns, but the
FAA declined to act.72 Later that year, the Department of De-
fense (DOD) found in their audit of the airline that Colgan Air
had inadequate internal audit systems to check and maintain
safe operations.73 Like the FAA, the DOD failed to act and Col-
64 See Claire Trageser, The Cost of Becoming a Pilot is Making the Job a Pipe Dream,
MASHABLE (Apr. 20, 2016), https://mashable.com/2016/04/20/regional-pilot-
shortage/#gEarIEnKKGqM [https://perma.cc/8J8P-DMMF].
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gan Air was permitted to continue air service.74 Two years later,
the DOD again found that Colgan Air had inadequate safety
checks and a “lack of management” and again allowed Colgan
Air to continue operating, but this time required Colgan Air to
perform “corrective action.”75
Finally, through the majority of 2008, both the FAA and Col-
gan Air noted improper pilot operations of the new Bombardier
Q400 aircraft.76 Colgan Air had a shortage of supervisory pilots
for the new aircraft and brought in supervisory pilots that had
never been trained on the Q400.77 By the end of 2008, Colgan
Air had still not finished the Q400’s operation guidelines for
pilots, which resulted in a knowledge gap for pilots in how to
properly operate the aircraft in abnormal or emergency
conditions.78
These safety concerns came to a head in February 2009 when
Colgan Air Flight 3407, a Q400 aircraft operated as a regional
carrier for Continental Airlines, crashed outside of Buffalo, New
York, killing all forty-nine people on board the aircraft and one
person on the ground.79 Following the accident, the NTSB con-
ducted an investigation to determine the cause and contributing
factors of the accident.80 During their investigation, the NTSB
discovered that the first officer, employed by Colgan for nearly a
year, had stayed up all night to catch a flight from her home in
Seattle, Washington, to Newark International Airport in New
Jersey to pilot Colgan Flight 3407 the next day.81 She had
planned to sleep in the crew lounge before the flight.82 The
NTSB also discovered that the captain, employed by Colgan Air
for approximately three and a half years with over 3,000 flight
hours, was logged on to a computer at 3 a.m.83 Further, while










81 Id.; see also Richard Collins, A Double Tragedy: Colgan Air Flight 3407, AIR
FACTS (Mar. 28, 2014), https://airfactsjournal.com/2014/03/double-tragedy-col
gan-air-flight-3407/ [https://perma.cc/2BKW-BSLP].
82 Collins, supra note 81; Wald, supra note 79.
83 Collins, supra note 81; Wald, supra note 79.
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had a reputation of sleeping in the crew lounge at Newark de-
spite the airline threatening termination for pilots that used the
lounge for overnight stays.84 The NTSB found that these pilots
were fatigued.85 In addition to the finding of pilot fatigue, the
NTSB also found that the pilots were talking incessantly about
matters unrelated to the flight when they were meant to main-
tain a sterile cockpit and that, potentially, the lack of realism in
Colgan’s flight training resulted in failed recovery attempts from
the pilots when they faced the emergency in real life.86
However, despite these contributing factors, the NTSB ulti-
mately concluded that the accident was caused by “[t]he acci-
dent captain’s history of training failures” and actions that were
“inconsistent with his training and were instead consistent with
startle and confusion.”87 During its investigation, the NTSB
found that, prior to his employment, the captain had failed a
number of flight tests and had “disapprovals on single-engine
and multi-engine commercial check rides but had neglected to
mention those” on his employment application.88 Once actually
employed by Colgan Air, he also received unsatisfactory grades
on three proficiency checks for abnormal aircraft operations,
such as single-engine landings and rejected take-offs, until given
the opportunity to pass on rechecks.89 In fact, these repeated
instances of incompetence in abnormal operations made the
captain a candidate for remedial training, but that remedial
training did not appear to have ever taken place.90
Following the accident, the families of the victims began lob-
bying Congress for greater and more urgent regulation to in-
crease flight safety standards in the United States.91 Their
lobbying led to the Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improve-
ment Act (ASPIA) of 2009 and its partial incorporation in the
84 Wald, supra note 79.
85 Collins, supra note 81; Wald, supra note 79.






90 Frank James, Colgan-Buffalo Plane Crash: Errors Began Pre-Flight, NPR (Feb. 2,
2010), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2010/02/colganbuffalo_plane
_crash_erro.html [https://perma.cc/V97M-53J8].
91 Continental Flight 3407 Families – Their Journey, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/flyingcheap/continental-3407/ [https://perma.cc/UZ4
H-HRT7] (last updated Dec. 8, 2010).
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Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension
Act (FAAEA) of 2010.92 As a result, Congress, through the FAA,
required an overhaul to airline fatigue programs, adoption of
safety management systems (SMS), and for incoming airline pi-
lots to have 1,500 hours of flight training experience.93
II. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO COLGAN AIR
FLIGHT 3407
With three of the top ten busiest airports in the world, the
United States’ airspace must be well managed to maintain
safety.94 The FAA protects the world’s largest and busiest air-
space through air traffic control and regulatory oversight of air-
line, airport, and maintenance operations.95 Due to the size of
the airline industry in the United States, for this management to
be successful, airlines and their pilots must be directly involved
to ensure that they operate in the safest way possible and that no
shortcuts are taken in preference of profit. This section of the
Comment explores Congress’s efforts to increase airline ac-
countability for safety through the requirements of the 1,500-
hour rule, fatigue management, and safety management as a re-
sult of the Colgan Air accident.
A. THE 1,500-HOUR RULE
The final rule change following the Colgan Air accident
moves away from the flexible safety systems offered by fatigue
risk management systems (FRMS) and SMS to firm training re-
quirements for new commercial pilots. Following the Colgan Air
accident investigation, Congress honed in on the NTSB’s find-
ing of lack of training and changed the training required for
pilots to become employed at the commercial airline level.96
Prior to the accident, commercial-airline first officers were re-
quired to have accrued a minimum of 250 hours of flight time.97
Given the NTSB’s findings, Congress issued the 1,500-hour rule,
92 Id.
93 Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111–216, §§ 212, 215, 217, 124 Stat. 2348, 2362, 2366, 2368.
94 See James Chrisman, This Is the Busiest Airport in the World, THRILLIST (Mar. 13,
2019), https://www.thrillist.com/news/nation/busiest-airport-in-the-world-2019
[https://perma.cc/5VVM-J66E].
95 See Air Traffic, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/
[https://perma.cc/M93X-G32V] (last visited July 27, 2019).
96 See Garcia, supra note 9.
97 Id.
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which went into effect in 2013.98 The rule requires that first of-
ficers applying to commercial airlines have at least 1,500 hours
of accrued flight time to qualify for the necessary pilot certifi-
cate.99 This rule results in a 600% increase in required flight
hours for pilots to begin their careers with commercial airlines.
Then, to become a full-fledged captain, the pilot is required to
earn an additional 1,000 flight hours.100
The FAA Administrator stated that this increase in flight
hours was done to guarantee a “stronger foundation of aeronau-
tical knowledge and experience” before ever being permitted to
fly for a commercial air carrier.101 With this in mind, the FAA
has allowed for certain exceptions to this rule.102 The FAA allows
military pilots and university-trained students to acquire a “re-
stricted” commercial air transport license.103 For U.S. military
pilots, this means the flight-hour requirement is cut in half to
750 hours.104
The university-trained exception is a bit more complicated
and differs between graduates holding a bachelor’s degree and
those holding an associate’s degree. If a pilot acquires a bache-
lor’s degree in aviation at a qualified university, completes 60
academic credit hours in aviation or aviation-related coursework
approved by the FAA, presents their transcript to the FAA, and
holds a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane category
and instrument rating from an FAA approved curriculum, then
the required flight hours decrease to 1,000.105 For a pilot who
has acquired an associate’s degree in aviation at a qualified uni-
versity, the flight-hour requirement becomes 1,250 flight hours
if the pilot meets the same requirements as above.106 But rather
than 60 academic credit hours, the pilot is only required to com-





101 Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Boosts Aviation Safety with New
Pilot Qualification Standards (July 10, 2013), http://www.faa.gov/news/press_re
leases/news_story.cfm?newsId=14838 [https://perma.cc/PV86-8AMY].
102 See id.
103 14 C.F.R. § 61.160(a)–(g) (2013).
104 Id. § 61.160(a).
105 Id. § 61.160(b)(1)–(4).
106 Id. § 61.160(c)(1)–(4).
107 Id. § 61.160(c)(2).
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While the reductions in training hours alleviated the impact
for certain classes of pilots, these are still increases of 300%,
400%, and 500% respectively. Because of this, there is large con-
cern across the industry that there will be unintended, wide-
spread consequences that require immediate remedial action
on the part of Congress.108 These consequences are discussed in
Part III of this Comment, along with the combined impact of
FRMS and SMS implementation.
B. FATIGUE RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
The FAA defines fatigue as “a physiological state of reduced
mental or physical performance capability resulting from lack of
sleep or increased physical activity that can reduce a flightcrew
member’s alertness and ability to safely operate an aircraft or
perform safety-related duties.”109 As seen in the Colgan Air
crash, fatigue is often a contributing factor in accident reports,
despite not being listed as the primary cause.110 Historically, fa-
tigue is so commonplace in aviation because the industry has
long work-duty periods with unpredictable hours because
weather and other operational impediments—like government
shutdowns—can delay or cancel flights.111 Because of this, fa-
tigue is a growing concern in aviation across the world.112 In the
1930s, the first attempt at mitigating fatigue was made by insti-
tuting sleep recommendations and limitations to flight time and
layover periods for flightcrews.113 However, through 2009, the
year of the Colgan Air crash, few changes were made to fatigue
management regulations after the initial attempt.114 In 2011, as
108 See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 9; Barbara Peterson, How the Pilot Shortage Could
Change the Way We Fly, CONDE NAST TRAVELER (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.cn
traveler.com/story/how-the-pilot-shortage-could-change-the-way-we-fly [https://
perma.cc/U8NJ-7699]; Robert Silk, Regional Airlines, Hit by Pilot Shortage, Seek Ex-
ceptions to 1,500-Hour Rule, TRAVEL WKLY. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.travel
weekly.com/Travel-News/Airline-News/Regional-airlines-seek-exceptions-to-
1500-hour-rule [https://perma.cc/CJN3-KFDG].
109 14 C.F.R. § 117.3 (2012).
110 Key Safety Issues, FLIGHT SAFETY FOUND., https://flightsafety.org/safety-is
sue/fatigue/ [https://perma.cc/Q629-E9E8] (last visited Jan. 15, 2019).
111 See John A. Caldwell et al., Fatigue Countermeasures in Aviation, 80 AVIATION
SPACE & ENVTL. MED. 29, 29 (2009).
112 See id.
113 Id. at 30.
114 Id.
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part of the ASPIA, the FAA adopted several changes to the fed-
eral regulations regarding fatigue management.115
Prior to the rule change, flightcrew rest periods were a “mini-
mum” of 9 hours but could be reduced to 8.116 This rest period
included the local travel time to a suitable rest location and the
time it takes to travel back to the airport.117 Because of the re-
mote location of many airports, many flightcrews found that the
travel time to their place of rest interfered with their sleep time
and often placed them below the recommended 8 hours of
sleep for an average adult.118 These rest hours varied based on
whether the flight was domestic or international.119 However, af-
ter the rule change, the minimum rest period was increased to
10 hours, and those 10 hours must provide the opportunity for
the flightcrew to obtain at least 8 uninterrupted sleep hours.120
Domestic and international flights are also now treated the same
in terms of required rest periods.121
There were also major changes to the flight-duty period for
flightcrews.122 Previously, flight time was restricted to 10 hours a
day and to a maximum duty period of 1,400 hours per year.123
Under current regulations, flight and duty times are greater seg-
mented to better reflect fatigue as it affects a person over
time.124 Flight-duty periods can now vary between 9 and 14
hours, with a reduction dependent on the crew member’s num-
ber of flight segments flown.125
Perhaps the greatest change to fatigue regulations lies in the
FAA’s division of responsibility. Pilots, as well as the airlines, are
now required to aid in the enforcement of fatigue regula-
tions.126 Pilots must confirm before they fly both that they are
working in compliance with the regulations—by tracking their
flight, rest, and duty hours—and that, through compliance, they
115 See Sarina Houston, FAA’s Final Rule for Pilot Duty and Rest Requirements, BAL-
ANCE CAREERS (Dec. 25, 2018), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/faa-final-
rule-pilot-duty-and-rest-requirements-282927 [https://perma.cc/4CXV-PM2K].
116 Id.
117 Caldwell et al., supra note 111, at 31.
118 Id. at 31–32.
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are physically fit for duty.127 This affirmative duty allows pilots to
ensure the safety of a flight by self-reporting rather than relying
on their employers to make the call regarding a pilot’s
wellbeing.128
Furthermore, as a part of the rule changes, the FAA shifted
from suggesting FRMS to requiring FRMS.129 FRMS are manage-
ment systems that utilize data in a systematic way to “continu-
ously monitor and manage safety risks associated with fatigue-
related error.”130 FRMS should utilize “scientific principles and
knowledge as well as operational experience.”131 The FAA re-
quires that, as a part of FRMS, airlines adopt a fatigue risk man-
agement policy, a training program, a reporting system, a
monitoring system, an incident reporting process, and a way to
evaluate performance.132 FRMS is entwined with the reporting
requirements for pilots. It provides an internal system for pilots
to report issues to their employer.133 In turn, airlines should
take the data provided to make changes to their operations and
ensure both the efficient use of staff and the safety of the
flight.134
Finally, an important note regarding the requirement is the
statute’s broad language and vague requirements.135 The lan-
guage permits the airlines flexibility in the way they implement
FRMS by allowing them to tailor their system to properly meet
the uniqueness of their own operation. For instance, airlines
with a large, international route network will likely have differ-
ent fatigue concerns than a regional airline flying short routes.
127 See id.
128 See Christopher Freeze, Fatigue Management: Best Practices and Lessons
Learned, AIR LINE PILOT (Mar. 2018), http://www.alpa.org/news-and-events/air-
line-pilot-magazine/fatigue-management [https://perma.cc/NYC8-BLTS] (re-
porting support by both airlines and the Air Line Pilots Association pilots union,
while acknowledging that individual pilot willingness to report is going to require
more time and further understanding of FRMS processes).
129 14 C.F.R § 117.7(a) (2012); see also Houston, supra note 115.
130 14 C.F.R. § 117.3.
131 Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMS), SKYBRARY, https://skybrary.aero/
index.php/Fatigue_Risk_Management_System_(FRMS) [https://perma.cc/53U
4-BSJP] (last updated May 23, 2019).
132 14 C.F.R. § 117.7(b).
133 See Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMS), supra note 131.
134 Id.
135 See David Perecman, Congress Passes Law to Increase Safety on Commercial
Flights, HG.ORG LEGAL RES., https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/congress-passes-
law-to-increase-safety-on-commercial-flights-19803 [https://perma.cc/7KLS-DJ6J]
(last visited July 11, 2019).
282 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [84
A flight from Dallas to Sydney, Australia, lasts about seventeen
hours.136 This alone exceeds the new flight-duty period and re-
quires a number of accommodations and planning to meet FAA
guidelines that would not be necessary on the vast majority of
flights in the United States.137
C. SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
SMS takes a similar analytical approach to FRMS but applies it
on a wider operational basis. SMS is a concept that has been
around at an international level since the turn of the 21st cen-
tury.138 Initially designed for occupational safety and health in
the workplace, these systems have shifted to reducing all risks
associated with operational responsibilities to maintain and
streamline a high level of safe performance.139 As part of the
response to the Colgan Air accident, Congress instructed the
FAA to develop a rule requiring all commercial airlines to imple-
ment SMS.140 The final rule was issued in 2015 and required
that SMS be implemented by the carriers in 2018.141
The FAA defines SMS as “the formal, top-down, organization-
wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the effec-
tiveness of safety risk controls.”142 This language requires indi-
viduals at the highest levels of the organizational structure to
participate in safety and safety management. By requiring the
first-hand participation of high-level employees, SMS ensures
that the administration and maintenance of safety is a top prior-
ity of every airline.143
136 Courtney McCaffrey, Could You Survive These 10 Longest Flights?,
FLIGHTNETWORK (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.flightnetwork.com/blog/10-
flights-longest-world/ [https://perma.cc/N8C3-Z7B2].
137 See 14 C.F.R. pt. 117 tbls. B, C (2012).
138 See Occupational Safety and Health Management Systems, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
https://www.ilo.org/safework/areasofwork/occupational-safety-and-health-man
agement-systems/lang—en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/S4E8-UZCY] (last vis-
ited Jan. 18, 2019).
139 See id.; see also Brian D. Israel, Environmental and Safety Management Systems in
Large Companies: Avoiding Pitfalls, AM. BAR ASSOC. TRENDS 4, 1 (2004).
140 FAA Final Rule Requires Safety Management Systems for Airlines, supra
note 29.
141 See id.
142 Safety Management System (SMS), FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (July 5, 2016), https:/
/www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sms/ [https://perma.cc/2EGM-G2WN].
143 See Safety Management System – Basis, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.
gov/about/initiatives/sms/explained/basis/ [https://perma.cc/NKH3-FXVW]
(last modified July 14, 2016).
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Though technology and system developments serve to im-
prove safety in air travel, safety gaps continue to exist in terms of
the human element.144 SMS is intended to bridge those gaps
and hone in on the performance of individuals and flight-
crews.145 To form this bridge, an airline’s SMS must utilize data
collected from employees in a way that allows for continuous
adaptation to meet specific safety needs.146 Two of the largest
benefits of SMS’s design are the continuous monitoring of the
airline’s safety status and the improvement of company safety
culture.147 By continuously monitoring data, it is believed that
airlines will be able to act not only reactively and proactively in
compliance with existing regulation but also in a predictive way
as the data brings potential problems to light.148 Safety culture
should improve within the organization as it becomes apparent
to front-line employees—such as flightcrew members—that up-
per-level management is not only concerned about their safety
but also actively seeking their input as to current issues and po-
tential avenues for improvement.149 SMS is widely supported
across the aviation community because of its prospective safety
and financial benefits.150 SMS regulation seeks to meet these
benefits by requiring airlines to have four components: (1)
safety policy; (2) safety risk management (SRM); (3) safety assur-
ance (SA); and (4) safety promotion.151
The safety policy is how airlines communicate upper-level
management’s “commitment to continually improving safety.”152
Through the safety policy, the airline will “define[ ] the meth-
ods, processes, and organizational structure” necessary to meet
its safety goals as consistent with the FAA’s regulatory goals.153
The airline will then communicate this throughout the organi-
zation and continue to review and edit the policy to adapt to the








151 Aviation Safety (AVS) Safety Management System Requirements, U.S. DEP’T
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establish a management board responsible for the continued
policy, performance, strategy, and allocation of safety re-
sources.155 The safety policy must also document: (1) a commit-
ment to implementing, maintaining, and improving SMS; (2) a
commitment to creating a positive safety culture by allowing
non-punitive safety reporting and encouraging employee-pro-
posed solutions; (3) a guideline for acceptable behavior and
safety objective setting and review; and (4) the responsibilities
that hold management and employees accountable for safety
oversight.156
SRM is a formal process with five steps: “describing the system,
identifying the hazards, analyzing the risk, assessing the risk, and
controlling the risk.”157 Despite the formality, SRM still permits
airlines to take immediate mitigation measures for any high-risk
situations that may arise.158 For situations that are not time sensi-
tive or after immediate mitigation attempts have been made, the
SRM process should occur.159 In this process, SRM must define
an acceptable level of risk and the criteria for determining those
levels so that management can make mitigation decisions as nec-
essary.160 The regulations also require that every step of SRM be
documented to increase transparency to stakeholders and en-
sure compliance with the law.161
The SA requirement of SMS is meant to support the “identifi-
cation of potential new hazards” and to determine whether “im-
plemented risk control strategies are adequately mitigating
safety risk.”162 This is done largely through the collection and
analysis of data collected through employee reporting, company
auditing, and assessments verifying compliance with the airline’s
own SMS, as well as any FAA orders, standards, and policies.163
When the airline does find “nonconformance, noncompliance,
potential hazards, or ineffective controls,” new corrective ac-
tions must be taken at a high-priority level to ensure safe opera-
tions are being maintained.164 SA interacts closely with SRM,
155 Id. at 10.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 12.
158 Id.
159 See id.
160 See id. at 13.
161 See id. at 12–14.
162 Id. at 15.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 19.
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assessing the planned changes as implemented in SRM that
prompt new mitigating changes to the system.165
The last element, safety promotion, is the “combination of
training and communication of safety information to support
the implementation and operation of an SMS in an organiza-
tion.”166 The FAA mandates safety promotion because it is what
creates SMS’s objective of “a positive safety culture among all
employees” by encouraging “shared values, actions, and behav-
iors” in demonstration of the airline’s commitment to safety
over profit.167 Perhaps the most important requirement is the
communication and fostering of a non-punitive, cooperative en-
vironment for employees reporting safety concerns.168 Promo-
tion of this type of positive culture is the only way SMS can work
effectively. Since they are in everyday operations, often,
frontline employees like pilots and flight attendants are in a bet-
ter position to identify hazards in a timely way.169
III. DOES THE LEGISLATION JUSTIFY THE COST?
Colgan Air Flight 3407 was the deadliest transportation acci-
dent in the United States since 2001.170 In light of the tragedy, it
was natural for Congress to push through swift regulations to
address what caused it. The legislation has major economic im-
pacts, as seen in the analysis below, but generally follows the fun-
damental shift in the aviation industry’s focus on safety from
only technical improvements to improving human and organiza-
tional function.171 However—with the 1,500-hour rule’s poten-
165 See Safety Management System – Components, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://
www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sms/explained/components/ [https://perma.cc
/9FQL-ENB5] (last modified Sept. 11, 2017).
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tial economic impact, the lack of quantifiable safety
improvement, and the availability of other safety insurance
methods—the 1,500-hour requirement should be reduced and
high-quality training should be enforced.
A. THE LAW’S ECONOMIC IMPACT AND THE IMPENDING PILOT
SHORTAGE
Since the end of regulation and guaranteed revenue, airlines
have become increasingly revenue driven and cost sensitive in
their operational decisions.172 This makes sense considering the
sheer size of airline operations in the United States. For in-
stance, in 2017, Delta Airlines incurred $35 billion in operating
expenses, while American Airlines incurred $38 billion.173 Be-
cause of these massive costs and the high cost-sensitivity of the
airline industry, to fully understand the impact of the FAAEA,
an examination of the law’s impact on airline operations is
necessary.
When the FAA introduces new regulations, operating costs of
the airlines are sure to increase as they are required to imple-
ment and maintain the requirements.174 At these beginning
stages of the ASPIA’s implementation, the pure cost impact on
airlines remains unclear.175 When the Act was passed, there was
no estimate as to the cost of implementation.176 However, in
2015, the FAA produced a cost estimate of SMS implementa-
tion.177 The FAA estimated that commercial airlines would
spend $224.3 million in SMS implementation over a ten-year pe-
riod across the industry.178 Given the billions spent by airlines
172 See De Jager, supra note 33, at 13.
173 Delta Air Lines Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 23, 2018); Am. Air-
lines Grp. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 21, 2018).
174 See CONG. BUDGET OFF., H.R. 3371: Airline Safety and Pilot Training Im-
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every year in operations, this is hardly an economic impact on
the airlines.179
On top of the relatively low economic investment necessary, if
done correctly and to the standards prescribed by the FAA, SMS
offers airlines a huge cost savings.180 The FAA has projected that
airlines can benefit from $205 million to $472.3 million over a
ten-year period.181 This monetary benefit is the result of the
proactive measures that airlines can take after analyzing front-
line reporting.182 It is believed that these proactive measures will
allow an airline to avoid spending the money it would have
spent on “damages from accidents, aircraft recovery costs, work-
place accident costs, and hikes in insurance.”183 Based on the
same proactive nature of FRMS, regardless of the cost of imple-
mentation, an assumption can be made that a similar economic
benefit will arise.184
The 1,500-hour rule presents a more difficult task in terms of
quantifying the regulatory cost without the availability of indus-
try or government projections. On its face, the rule simply re-
quires airlines to hire more experienced pilots. However, as with
most industries, pilots with more experience demand a higher
wage.185 Across all the domestic airlines, wages have begun to
skyrocket.186 In the regional airlines alone, starting pay has in-
creased from $20,000 to nearly $60,000 since the introduction
of the 1,500-hour rule.187 These increases have largely been at-
tributed to a worldwide pilot shortage in addition to the 1,500-
hour rule.188
179 See Delta Airlines, Annual Report, supra note 173; American Airlines, An-
nual Report, supra note 173.
180 See Okwera, supra note 177, at 34.
181 See id. at 43–44.
182 See id. at 2.
183 See id. at 53.
184 See Benefits of FRMS, FRMSFORUM, https://www.frmsforum.org/about-us/
benefits/ [https://perma.cc/3AZZ-G8NV] (last visited Jan. 22, 2019).
185 See Mike Arnot, How Much Do Pilots Make? Salaries from the Regionals to
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Over the next twenty years, the U.S. airline industry will re-
quire 117,000 new pilots to meet market demand.189 As previ-
ously discussed, when the ASPIA was passed, it increased the
flight-hour requirement from 250 hours to 1,500 hours.190 This
600% increase in flight-hour requirement put a lot of prospec-
tive pilots out of reach from commercial airline employment. A
pilot starting with zero experience flying must now spend nearly
$100,000 in flight training costs—at a reputable training
school—to achieve the experience necessary to become an air
transport pilot.191 For many young pilots, the change in regula-
tion was the end of the road because continuing their training
became financially unreasonable.192
With the 1,500-hour rule compounding the effects of a world-
wide pilot shortage,193 airlines have begun aggressive recruiting
techniques, in addition to increasing pay, to get ahead of the
pilot shortage and to sustain market growth.194 One regional air-
line has gotten creative and has begun to allow their pilots up to
fifteen days off a month with as many as thirty-five days of vaca-
tion a year.195 Other regional airlines have begun offering sign-
ing bonuses that can reach as high as $45,000.196 These bonuses
are also coming with promises of quicker promotions—with
some pilots moving from first officer to the captain’s seat in only
two years.197 For most regional airlines, the current pace at
which these incentives are increasing poses a real threat to their
189 Airlines Expected to Need 117K Pilots Over Next 20 Years, FOX 4 NEWS (Dec. 7,
2017), http://www.fox4news.com/business/airlines-expected-to-need-117k-pi
lots-over-next-20-years [https://perma.cc/3KMW-24FS].
190 Garcia, supra note 9.
191 See How Much Does Pilot Training Cost?, ATP, https://atpflightschool.com/
faqs/pilot-training-cost.html [https://perma.cc/UXY4-FQQJ] (last visited Aug.
13, 2019).
192 See Garcia, supra note 9.
193 Id.
194 See Tracy Rucinski, U.S. Airlines Tap Army Helicopter Pilots to Ease Shortage,
REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-aviation-
shortage-insight/u-s-airlines-tap-army-helicopter-pilots-to-ease-shortage-idUSKCN
1PH0CO [https://perma.cc/KEY2-MSBD].
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9-2QXU] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
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survival.198 This threat exists because regional airlines are oper-
ating on fixed revenue through codeshare agreements.199 As dis-
cussed in Part I of this Comment, because regional airlines have
no ability to change routes or influence pricing, a sharp rise in
labor costs will require other operational changes in an attempt
to reduce costs.200 For the carriers that cannot make the neces-
sary changes, it is likely that they will be unable to continue op-
erations, and the young pilots looking to gain experience for
the larger airlines will have one less option for employment.201
The Air Line Pilots Association International pilots union ar-
gues that there is not a true shortage of pilots, but rather, start-
ing pilots have been perpetually underpaid and this is the
market stabilizing.202 In 2016, the union stated that the number
of incoming qualified pilots was over double the number of
hired new pilots for that year.203 However, this snapshot into the
job market may be too shortsighted. Pilots from the Baby
Boomer generation are quickly heading into retirement.204 With
so many pilots exiting the job market, it is important to note the
1,500-hour rule will likely exacerbate the market for pilots over
the course of the next few years. While the monetary response
of the airlines to address staffing could be looked at as the free
market stabilizing itself, the practical implications on the rest of
the country could be startling.
B. PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE 1,500-HOUR RULE
As discussed in part in the introductory material of this Com-
ment, the commercial airline industry is one that has a massive
economic impact across the country. Airline operations drive
over 10 million jobs, 5 cents of every dollar of the United States’
gross domestic product, and $1.5 trillion in domestic economic
198 See Brian Sumers, U.S. Pilot Shortage Claims a Casualty: Will More Airlines Shut
Down?, SKIFT (Mar. 30, 2018), https://skift.com/2018/03/30/u-s-pilot-shortage-
claims-a-casualty-will-more-airlines-shut-down/ [https://perma.cc/5N2P-QNXY].
199 See Schlappig, supra note 56.
200 See Sumers, supra note 198.
201 Cf. Cervantes, supra note 63.
202 See Hethcock, supra note 196.
203 See id.
204 See The American Airline Industry Is Heading Toward a Pilot Shortage, WINGS J.
(Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.wingsjournal.com/american-airline-industry-head
ing-toward-pilot-shortage [https://perma.cc/9WM9-QJRW].
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activity.205 These numbers are produced by “transporting 2.4
million passengers and more than 58,000 tons of cargo daily.”206
It was exactly this type of role in the economy that led the fed-
eral government to subsidize and regulate airlines like a public
utility under the belief that airlines had to be able to survive
economic downturns to encourage economic growth and devel-
opment.207 This concern about survival has become increasingly
important as a volatile oil market looms over the airline industry
and labor costs—35% of all operating expenses—are expected
to climb in light of the airlines’ economic response to the pilot
shortage.208
This rise in operating expenses, especially if oil prices in-
crease, poses a lot of the same risks to the market as the end of
regulation. When faced with economic downturns, airlines first
look to decrease any unnecessary cost and if that fails, they at-
tempt to consolidate.209 Four airlines in the United States al-
ready control around 85% of the country’s air traffic.210 Based
on the current structure of the industry, further consolidation is
particularly dangerous to a prospective passenger’s choice in
travel.211 Coupled with rising labor costs, if an economic down-
turn of this type appeared imminent, it would likely require ac-
tion on the part of the government to expand the EAS
program.212 This would ensure that smaller markets continue to
see air service as airlines look to cut their less profitable routes
and regional carriers cease operations.213
An expansion of EAS would not only effectively pass the cost
of the 1,500-hour rule to federal taxpayers, but cities like Pitts-
burgh and St. Louis—that would unlikely qualify due to their
size—would face a real risk of continued service degradation.214
This means that smaller city governments will likely have to offer
205 See The Airline Industry – Is a Critical Economic Engine, AIRLINES FOR AM.,
http://airlines.org/industry/#economic [https://perma.cc/63M8-L4BF] (last
visited June 21, 2019).
206 See The Airline Industry – Connects Communities, AIRLINES FOR AM., http://
airlines.org/industry/#communities [https://perma.cc/VWX4-WBDB] (last vis-
ited June 21, 2019).
207 See Dempsey, supra note 11, at 140.
208 See Beers, supra note 3.
209 See De Jager, supra note 33, at 14, 140.
210 See Marshall, supra note 44.
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airlines monetary incentives to maintain air service.215 Without
doing so, these cities face the risk of losing their local businesses
as they choose to move to locations better equipped to conduct
modern business.216 Under this circumstance, it will be local tax-
payers paying the price of the legislation rather than just airline
consumers.217 Because of these practical threats, it is necessary
to evaluate whether the 1,500-hour rule’s benefits are worth the
costs and to analyze potential ways that the government can
meet similar goals without those threats.
C. THE BENEFIT OF THE 1,500-HOUR RULE AND POTENTIAL
ALTERNATIVES
Following the Colgan Air accident, the families of the de-
ceased lobbied Congress for more stringent training require-
ments under the belief that the pilots were inadequately
prepared to handle irregular operations.218 The ASPIA was in-
troduced to improve airline safety by ensuring that pilots receive
higher quality training and, by virtue of that training, have a
“strong[ ] foundation of aeronautical knowledge and experi-
ence.”219 To see the benefit of the legislation, it must be deter-
mined whether airline safety in this country has improved since
it was passed and whether that improvement can actually be at-
tributed to the rule change.
From the time of the Colgan Air accident to 2018, nearly 100
million U.S.-operated airline flights carried billions of people
without a single passenger fatality caused by an accident.220 In
fact, across the globe, flying is now safer than “driving, taking a
bus or a train, riding a bike or a motorcycle, or even walking.”221
However, improved aviation safety is not a new trend. Fatal acci-
dents have decreased in the United States every decade since
the 1950s as technology, understanding of human behavior, and
215 See id.
216 See Shrikant, supra note 50.
217 See Morris, supra note 47.
218 See Jerry Zremski, Aviation Safety Group Appears to Break with Flight 3407 Fami-
lies, BUFFALO NEWS, https://buffalonews.com/2018/03/07/flight-safety-group-ap
pears-to-break-with-flight-3407-families/ [https://perma.cc/EQF5-YLVA] (last
updated Feb. 8, 2019).
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note 101.
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government oversight has improved.222 For the ten years prior
to the Colgan Air accident, the risk of air travel fatalities in the
United States dropped 83%.223
Though fatality risk has decreased, it is true that when avia-
tion accidents do occur, they are predominantly the result of
pilot error due to: “poor actions or decisions, often caused by
fatigue, inebriation or lack of experience; and operational er-
rors, related to problems with flight instruction and training.”224
It is also true that an increase in flight training hours could at
least help reduce the lack-of-experience element of pilot er-
ror.225 However, the Flight Safety Foundation, an independent
international flight safety group, believes that flight hours by
themselves are not an accurate reflection of pilot knowledge,
skills, or professionalism.226 The NTSB and the FAA agree.227
Government studies have suggested that more experienced pi-
lots do not always outperform those with fewer hours and that a
minority of accidents actually involve pilots with less than 1,500
hours on the job.228 In fact, the Colgan Air captain had over
3,000 flight hours.229
Without any true support in accident history, government
studies, or the recent safety record, it appears that the 1,500-
hour rule may have been made too hastily and does not provide
the benefit Congress was seeking to establish. What is apparent
is that the 1,500-hour rule is going to exacerbate an existing and
growing pilot shortage that will threaten the economies of
smaller communities as well as customer choice. Congress
should move to remedy the situation and instead control for ac-
cident risk factors that are quantifiable.
222 How Aviation Safety Has Improved, ALLIANZ (2014), https://www.agcs.allianz.
com/insights/expert-risk-articles/how-aviation-safety-has-improved/ [https://
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Supporters of the 1,500-hour rule—like the Air Line Pilots As-
sociation pilots union—are resolved that the 1,500-hour rule re-
main as is.230 Some unions believe that, rather than minimize
the value of experience, Congress can address the perceived pi-
lot shortage by raising the mandatory retirement age from sixty-
five to sixty-seven.231 This is a strategy that was first used by Con-
gress five years ago when it raised the mandatory retirement age
from sixty to sixty-five.232 While this would provide a potential
solution to staffing problems and guarantee that experienced
pilots are in the cockpit, it seems to undermine the integrity of
the rest of the ASPIA.
SMS and FRMS, at their core, are designed to identify safety
hazards and mitigate those hazards in a way that allows pilots to
effectively do their jobs. Unfortunately, increased age brings
with it inherent safety hazards. Reflexes slow down as people
age.233 While allowing older pilots to continue flying does in-
crease the likelihood that the pilot can identify safety hazards
more quickly, it also increases the likelihood that they will be
slower to react.234 Additionally, increased age brings a greater
risk of associated memory impairment.235 Some studies have sug-
gested that chronic stress can exacerbate memory impairment
problems.236 Being a pilot for a major airline can easily be put
into the category of chronic stress.237 These pilots are operating
machines at 30,000 feet with direct responsibility for other peo-
ples’ lives.238 When they are on the ground, they are subject to
constant rescheduling as weather and operational issues become
apparent and often find themselves the target of customer com-
plaints. If an older pilot faces an emergency, potential memory
230 See Silk, supra note 108.
231 See Marisa Garcia, What to Know About the Mandatory Pilot Retirement Age,
TRAVEL & LEISURE (June 7, 2018), https://www.travelandleisure.com/airlines-air-
ports/pilot-retirement-age [https://perma.cc/C88K-DPQS].
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233 A Quick Look at Reflexes, UNIV. ROCHESTER MED. CTR., https://www.urmc.
rochester.edu/encyclopedia/content.aspx?ContentTypeID=1&ContentID=562
[https://perma.cc/U5TV-59Y8] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
234 See id.
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loss becomes a massive liability in terms of responding to the
safety hazard quickly. Finally, older pilots are more susceptible
to cardiovascular disease.239 While this is something that can be
detected in annual physicals, there remains a risk that disease
will go undetected or could develop within that year of time.240
If a cardiovascular event were to take place in the cockpit, the
safety of the flight would be immediately compromised, as the
co-pilot now must deal with the operation of the flight as well as
responding to the medical emergency.
Furthermore, the use of retired pilots does not alleviate the
issue of rising operational costs. As previously discussed, more
experienced pilots require more pay.241 By increasing the age of
retirement, airlines will still be required to increase their opera-
tional costs. Though it may not end up costing as much as the
recruiting incentives have, it still poses the risk that airlines may
face greater consolidation, and the public will see a reduction of
air service. Because of this and the continued risk of loss of ser-
vice, the option of increasing the mandatory retirement age is
not a risk that should be taken.
Instead, Congress should focus future legislation on increas-
ing safety standards and ensuring pilot qualifications by regulat-
ing the quality of training rather than focusing purely on the
quantity of flight training hours. As previously discussed, one
government study has suggested that experience does not neces-
sarily correlate to higher quality performance.242 In fact, Con-
gress already seems to have acknowledged that high-quality
training is preferable and more likely to ensure safe operations
through the hour reduction it allows for university-trained pi-
lots.243 One of the biggest reasons the government can be sure
that these pilots have the foundation that it wants is because the
government has a heavy hand in training these pilots.244 It is
likely that it is this high level of training as well as the potential
high-stress flight environments—like war zones—that makes the
government feel comfortable enough with military pilots’ expe-
239 See Ravi Dhingra & Ramachandran S. Vasan, Age as a Cardiovascular Risk
Factor, 96 MED. CLINIC N. AM. 87 (2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC3297980/ [https://perma.cc/WP2B-PGA6].
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rience to require only half that of a regularly-trained pilot. The
government also has a heavy hand in training university pilots.
The university must meet FAA-mandated curriculum standards
and the student must finish actual coursework approved by the
FAA to be eligible for the hour reduction.245
This is the logic that Congress should follow in addressing the
problems caused by the 1,500-hour rule. Currently not all train-
ing schools must be FAA-approved institutions.246 This results in
a wide variety of training quality amongst pilots, as some schools
choose only to meet the bare minimum required by law.247
Rather than allow for this variation and count on the revenue-
focused airlines to make up for the slack, Congress should re-
quire all flight training schools to meet FAA approval.248 By do-
ing so, Congress can ensure that all incoming pilots have the
same foundation of knowledge. While this may require greater
up-front cost on the part of incoming pilots, it will better guar-
antee that those pilots have success when they take their qualify-
ing exams and enter the workforce. By decreasing the variance
in flight-training schools, Congress can then decrease the flight-
training hours across the board to at least 1,250.249 In turn, Con-
gress should consider a continued decrease in hours of univer-
sity-trained pilots, as the required curriculum provides a level of
depth to flight training that may not be available in a regular
flight school. These flight-hour reductions will help mitigate the
pilot shortage and reduce the risk of service loss. Unlike increas-
ing the mandatory retirement age, this is a solution that ensures
foundational knowledge and supports the rest of the ASPIA.
The same foundation for all pilots allows an airline—through its
SMS—to focus on training concerns that are more particular to
their own operations, rather than fixing deficiencies that may
have been developed while the pilot was trained in a less-reliable
flight school. While the pilots operating the Colgan Air accident
were heavily fatigued at the time of the accident, if a more stan-
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dardized knowledge base had been in place at the time of the
accident, it is more likely that the pilots would have been able to
respond to the emergency. With all airlines now utilizing SMS,
airline travelers can rest easy because, if done properly, both air-
lines and the FAA will proactively discover any training deficien-
cies and other safety hazards that may arise, and they will be able
to address these hazards before any danger impacts an actual
flight.
IV. CONCLUSION
Airlines operate in a highly cyclical economic market.250 Be-
cause of this, airline profit margins are highly sensitive, and in
times of downturn, airlines will often cut flight service to any
routes they find unprofitable, which puts the economy’s smaller
communities in danger.251 While made with the noble intention
to improve flight safety, the ASPIA and FAAEA have exacer-
bated this risk by adopting the 1,500-hour rule. With the eco-
nomic risk the rule poses and the lack of evidence that the rule
has improved safety or that this number of hours is required to
ensure adequate foundational knowledge, Congress should re-
quire all flight schools meet FAA approval and lower the flight-
hour requirement to better reflect FAA and NTSB studies.252
250 See Kawika Piersona & John D. Sterman, Cyclical Dynamics of Airline Industry
Earnings, 49 SYS. DYNAMICS REV. 129, 129–30 (2013).
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